Armenian Constitutional Council Considers Major Change to Voting Rules: Will Armenia Abandon Stable Majority Rule Before the 2026 Election?

On September 5, the Constitutional Reforms Council of Armenia held a regular session where a key issue was discussed—the potential revision of the "stable majority" clause in the constitution. Daniel Ioannisyan, a council member and president of the "Informed Civil Union" NGO, put forward a proposal to abandon this provision. He explained that under the current Constitution’s Article 89, a political party could secure a parliamentary majority and form a government with as little as 25-30% of the popular vote. Ioannisyan criticized this system, describing it as the "winner-takes-all" principle, more suited to presidential systems than parliamentary governance.

In a parliamentary system, Ioannisyan argued, the stable majority clause distorts representation. He explained that under this rule, a party that wins a plurality of votes may receive bonus seats, inflating its power in the National Assembly beyond its actual support from the electorate. This, according to Ioannisyan, undermines the essence of parliamentary democracy, where multiple parties should ideally collaborate to form coalitions based on broader consensus.

Ioannisyan's proposal suggested an alternative process for forming the parliament. He proposed that if no party wins an outright majority, the first session of the National Assembly should not take place until political forces negotiate and form a coalition government. If no coalition is formed within a set time frame, the President would have to call for new elections. This would encourage parties to cooperate and ensure the formation of a government based on a true parliamentary majority, rather than relying on the stable majority provision.

During the session, other council members raised concerns about whether eliminating the stable majority clause could lead to governance crises. They questioned if removing this provision would risk parliamentary deadlock or create instability if no coalition could be agreed upon in time. However, Ioannisyan pointed to international examples, noting that only three countries have implemented stable majority rules in their parliamentary systems without issues arising elsewhere. He also referenced local elections in Armenia, where similar rules were abolished, and coalition governments were formed without governance problems.

The council further debated whether the issue should be considered as part of broader constitutional reforms or dealt with separately. The larger constitutional reform process is scheduled to be finalized by a referendum in 2027, but some members of civil society and political parties have suggested fast-tracking the revision of the stable majority clause to ensure it is changed before the next parliamentary elections.

In an interview with The Armenian Report, Daniel Ioannisyan elaborated on the discussion, stating, "The stable majority regulation gives the winning party artificial majority through bonus seats. This discussion is about whether we should spin out this part of the reform process and change it in the National Assembly before the upcoming elections." He also emphasized that while many constitutional changes require a referendum, some regulations, including the stable majority clause, could be amended by the parliament alone.

The session lasted longer than expected, and the council ultimately decided to postpone the vote on this matter until future meetings. The debate over the stable majority clause reflects broader questions about how to best ensure fair representation and effective governance in Armenia's evolving political landscape. As the Constitutional Reforms Council continues its work, this issue will remain at the forefront of discussions about the country’s democratic system and electoral fairness. 

Further sessions will be held to continue this important debate, with more political and legal considerations to be addressed before a final decision is made.